

IN SEARCH OF LOST TIME: PROVIDENCE AS AESTHETIC VISION IN *ANDREI*

***RUBLEV* AND AUGUSTINE**

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Perhaps that is the one thing I wish to tell you. Sometimes the visionary aspect of any particular day comes to you in the memory of it, or it opens to you over time...I believe there are visions that come to us only in memory, in retrospect.

Marilynne Robinson, *Gilead*

I

The work of Andrei Tarkovsky might be said to constitute the cinematic thematization of the experience of time as such – time as human and therefore as a moral space. Film for Tarkovsky presents the possibility of a verisimilitude that thematizes the experience of time itself: in no other medium is time directly the mode of presentation, yet also the object of the artist’s craft – a “sculpting” of a block of time, the space of the ordering of the cinematic image.¹ A Tarkovsky film can be understood as an exploration of the meaning of human temporality, of time itself as a moral and spiritual space in which the meaning of the human is realized and portrayed. Hence film is *imprinted time*.² Further, Tarkovsky sees the viewing of a film as itself the impetus of an audience seeking “lost time,” an answer to the “spiritual vacuum” of the “conditions of modern existence:”³ the realization of the cinematic character in the chronotope⁴ of the film is an experience in which the viewer participates in a certain self-becoming. The film

becomes a means of vision, a way of ordering the whole so as to become comprehensible in light of its end.

Hence for Tarkovsky time and memory – that uniquely human experience of temporality – interpenetrate; time is the space of the pullulation of memory, the form of the moral happening of self in the space between the gaze of the camera and the face of the actor, and the image is the condensation of that happening and the structure of its eventuality. This accounts for the disequilibrium of a Tarkovsky film, for memory and imagination are equally privileged with the diegetic present of the work, and often the lines are blurred, if not indistinguishable, and signaled only by the association of images within the frame; Tarkovsky's cinematic language regularly eschews fades, dissolves, or subjective close-ups to signal temporal transitions, for memory *is* the Tarkovkyian character as she inhabits the filmic frame. Herein lies the clue to the density and obscurity attendant to the initial viewing of a Tarkovsky work: the fundamental cinematic logic is altered, for it not *narrative* but *image* and the emotional resonance inherent in the image that forms the grammar of Tarkovsky film: hence a work like *Andrei Rublev* is constructed episodically, coherent only by the concatenation of image and symbol calling to one another across the spaces of memory – Rublev's and ours – to form an aesthetic whole only in light of its end. The imbrication of memory and experience can be subtle and oneiric, as in *Rublev* or *The Sacrifice*; literal and narratologically thematized, as in *Solaris*; or it can be the formal principle of the work, as in the famously opaque (and brilliant) *Mirror*. As such, the suggestion of the Tarkovskyian cinematic chronotope is the configuration of memory in the aesthetic vision, a vision in which the happening of the self is subsumed into a certain kind of vision: in *Rublev*, this vision becomes contemplation.

II

Andrei Rublev is the story of the famous Russian monk and icon painter of the 15th century. Constituting not a biography so much as a series of seven episodes or vignettes, the work is a meditation on the nature of the aesthetic itself as it intersects with the moral space of memory and the history of a people. Rublev traverses the landscape of Russia as a witness (the Tarkovskyan protagonist is generally a passive and stoic character inhabiting the margins of the frame – Rublev never paints a stroke onscreen) of a troubled and bloodstained era of brutal Tatar invasions and raids, internecine struggles for power, and the devastations of plague and famine. It is against the backdrop of unspeakable violence that Rublev wrestles with the possibility of the beautiful: this is illustrated early in the film as two monks discuss the aesthetics of his icons as a man is tortured, cruciform, outside the door. A sequence entitled “The Raid,” portraying the Tatar sack of the town of Vladimir, is the fulcrum point of the film. In a frame full of kinetic strata reminiscent of Kurosawa, Tarkovsky’s camera isolates and foregrounds the cruelties that throw the brutal and the inhuman into a kind of chiaroscuro: the dragging of a peasant woman off to experience “Tatar love;” the torture of the prince’s official, who has his tongue melted out of his head by the boiling iron of the cross he wishes to kiss before he dies; the murder of Rublev’s apprentice Foma. Tarkovsky highlights the violence of this raid even further by showing the natural world itself as victim: a cow burning alive, and the death throes and killing of that Tarkovskyan image of life *par excellence*, the horse. This all culminates in the slaughter of the villagers in Rublev’s newly painted cathedral. And the decisive and tragic moment: a simpleton woman, a “holy fool” whom Rublev has taken under his protection, is carried off to be raped: he is forced to kill the soldier, a fellow Russian, to save her.

A cathedral strewn with corpses: Rublev mourns the fatal sin of murder as he contemplates the carnage of violence all around him. Conversing with the ghost (or the memory)

of his mentor Theophanes the Greek, he swears a vow of silence in penitence for his sin, a vow that will bind his tongue for some 16 years (“Live between divine forgiveness and your own torment,” Theophanes tells him). He gives up painting. One senses that it is not only the tragic action forced upon Andrei, but the protest against the violence of Russian history, the trauma of a world and earth that mocks the very possibility of the beautiful and the iconic, that leads to this choice. Indeed, in the prior chapter Rublev had refused to paint the Last Judgment after seeing the persecution of a witch: “I don’t want to terrify people,” he tells his friend Danil. “It disgusts me.” This exchange is the moment of the entry of the holy fool, the idiot woman, into the film, and Rublev speaks a protest against the church and against the princes – against all those who profit from the suffering of the Russian people – when he says of her, “She is not a sinner.” She, and all those who suffer the violence of a blood-stained history.

The trauma of a violated memory (or a memory of violation) imposes silence upon the artist. The aporia of the inhuman occupies the center of the cinematic text, the rift in the memory of the icon painter that refuses to be closed: lost time is the time organized according to the absence of meaning. But it is the long seventh chapter of the film that presents, not a solution (precisely the refusal of one), but an apotheosis of the wound of memory. Rublev witnesses the audacious spectacle of a boy who claims to know the secret of bell-casting and agrees to create a bell for the prince. The vitality and boldness of the creative vision finally stirs the monk to speak once more: he happens upon the boy weeping in the mud after the triumph of the sounding of the bell, and the boy tearfully reveals that it was all a sham – he knows nothing of his father’s bell-casting craft. The miracle of his success and the audacity of his action moves Rublev to speak once more: “Let’s go together,” he tells the boy. “You’ll cast bells and I’ll paint icons.”

The film has been, for well over three hours, portrayed in the sober shades of black and white. But it is after the inspiration of the artistic vision once more, the pledge to *see* and to *pray* (for an icon is after all a kind of prayer), that the epilogue bursts into astonishing color. From the ashes of a fire the camera rises, and in one of the most astonishing moments on film, it finally turns to the absent center of all that has gone before, the vision of what has been heretofore refused the viewer: the contemplation of Rublev's icons. Tracing abstractly lines, colors, and contours, then figures that evoke the cinematic images of Rublev's wounded memory – a horse, a cathedral, a prince, we realize that the images of the film were evoked and called into being by the images of the icons, just as the film suggests that the images of the icons are a kind of apotheosis of the images of a life. Finally, in the full vision of Rublev's masterpieces, *The Trinity* and *Jesus Pantocrator*, the film *shows* us what cannot be *said*: the beautiful is possible only out of the ashes of pain and death. The dissemination of the iconic images throughout the film transforms *the film itself into an icon*. And only on the basis of a certain kind of vision, for the end the film is ordered to is the vision of God. There is no answer – there is the stark rejection of such – to give any “meaning” to the suffering of Rublev or the Russian people. Instead, the vision of the beautiful and the sacred figures an event in which the spaces of memory are taken up into contemplation and an aesthetic vision that is itself the redemption of lost time. For the icon in the film is a way of portraying the whole of Rublev's life, a whole caught up into the contemplation of God, a whole that catches the viewer up as well, for the only way to participate in the vision is to suffer the film in its *meaninglessness* so as to be present to its *transfiguration*. The cinematic meditation on the aesthetic redemption of a life becomes a profound revelation of the human meaning of time itself as an aesthetic category – a meaning gained in the iconic vision of God. Like Job before the whirlwind, the divine gives no answer to the *unanswerable* question

of human agony, for there is no answer to *lost time*, the time that is essentially *loss*, to the ravaging of a human life; wholeness is not given in any solution, but only in vision, only in the seeing that in the seeing of God sees its life in God and therefore sees that life as a kind of aesthetic whole: the seeing of a *divinized* imagination, when the whole of one's time is made simply: glory. Time itself, the space of memory, is taken into the eternity of the vision of God.

Thus far, then: *the aesthetic vision is the redemption of lost time insofar as the work of art is the transfigured whole of a time.*

III

“By the Platonic books,” says Augustine, “I was admonished to return into myself...I entered and with my soul's eye, such as it was, saw above that same eye of my soul the immutable light higher than my mind.”⁵ Augustine trembles with “love and awe,” but finds himself yet “in the region of dissimilarity.” It is in the encounter with – and the refusal of – the books of the Platonists (by which he of course means Plotinus) that Augustine's vision is transformed, for he finally learns therein – in the return into himself – that God *is*, and all doubt departs. In this vision, the basic aporia of evil that had troubled the sometime Manichean dissipates, because in considering the totality, not only does evil show itself as nothing, but the totality reveals itself as *good* insofar as it *is*, for existence itself is a good.⁶ It is the whole that is the good, for it is in the order of the whole that God's purposes are displayed.

But I am not concerned here with Augustine's aesthetic theodicy, as appropriate as it might seem. Rather we turn to another page, the first of the “ascent” passages in *Confessions*:

I asked myself why I approved of the beauty of bodies...In the course of this inquiry why I made such value judgments as I was making, I found the unchangeable and authentic eternity of truth to transcend my mutable mind. And so step by step I ascended from bodies to the soul which perceives through the body, and from there to its inward force...From there again I ascended to the power of reasoning...which in myself I found to be mutable...It withdrew itself

from the contradictory swarms of imaginative fantasies, so as to discover the light by which it was flooded. At that point it had no hesitation in declaring that the unchangeable is preferable to the changeable, and that on this ground it can know the unchangeable...So in the flash of a trembling glance it attained to that which is...But I did not possess the strength to keep my vision fixed.

And thus back to the region of dissimilarity. The Augustinian *ascensus* that organizes both *Confessions* and *De Trinitate* crosses here with the thematic that expresses the crafting of an interiority: *tu autem eras interior intimo meo*, he says, “you were more inward than my most inward part.”⁷ In what Denys Turner calls a “self-subverting” schematic of interiority, the rhetoric of the *Confessions* revolves around the interplay of this passage: “the more ‘interior’ we are the more our interiority opens out to that which is inaccessibly ‘above’ and beyond it.”⁸

The progression is well-known: from the beauty of bodies to reflection on the mind and thus to contemplation of the light of eternal truth that illuminates the mind, there to behold, if but for a moment, Truth itself, the eternal God. But this ascent is predicated on the logic of interiority, and it is this logic that occupies Augustine, for he is after all searching for God in the *Confessions*, and not only is he searching for God, he is searching for God in the landscapes of *memory*. The paradox: how does one search for that which one does not know? If the longing of the heart is to rest in the God for whom it is *restless*, the space of *anamnesis* must always already recall the God from whom it has fallen. God dwells in the memory, for the dwelling of God *is* memory, insofar as *mens* participates in this God in its capacity to behold truth and beauty, that goodness through which it is necessary that all good things be good.⁹ What will be later thematized in *De Trinitate* is here expressed simultaneously *performatively* and *speculatively*, for Augustine is at the same time seeking to answer the question of lost time (the agony of recalling a life of transgression: where was God when he stole the pears and when Carthage was a cauldron of illicit loves all around him?) and enacting that search in a self-writing: the only way

to search for the whole of a life is to write that whole and therefore to write the self – to write that whole as a *prayer*. *Anamnesis* become *amanuensis*.

IV

But we are speaking of vision. If memory is the space of the mind that opens into the transcendent that transcends by its dwelling in intimacy, if God dwells in the memory, it is because it is in interior vision that we behold God. Augustine's quest, in his life as narrated and thus (of course) retrojected into a certain itinerary, is a quest for the vision of God – to know and to see the divine. Which means that the *Confessions* is a literary quest for and *enactment of* the vision of God. In the mystery of self-writing is performed the narration of a kind of providence, for in it is revealed: it was God acting the entire time. We have here the meaning of that dramatic literary shift that beguiles the unwary reader, for *Confessions* shifts from “autobiography” to speculative theology, from the story of conversion and the death of Monica to a meditation on memory (Book X), time (XI), and creation (XII-XIII). Put thusly, the progression of the narrative is a performance of its theme: the inscription of the self within the categories of *memory*, *time*, and *creation*.

If God dwells in the memory, then what is the nature of memory? If God is more interior to me than I am to myself, then “May I know you, *who know me*” – and therefore know myself, and God in myself.¹⁰ The ascent takes place in the memory, for beauty – the beauty of bodies – cries that God made it, but only for those who hear this outward voice and compare it with the truth within.¹¹ “What then do I love when I love my God?” In the “vast palaces of memory,” where the treasure of images of beautiful things are stored, the mind beholds the light that illuminates them all. There is something in memory, for Augustine, that both contains the capacity for seeing God the beautiful in the objects of beauty, yet also disseminates the beautiful

in a scattering of the gaze. The mutability of the mind does not possess the strength to keep the vision fixed. The vision of God yet eludes.

The reason why is that in speaking of change, of dissimilarity, of the mutability of the mind's vision, Augustine is speaking of *time*. God is above the mind, eternal, one, the immutable: yet all that the mind can contain is as the syllables of the psalm: passing away even as it is apprehended. Hence the famous and confounding question: "what is time?" We know what it is until someone asks us, he says. Time is a *distentio*, a distention of the soul – the stretching of the life "in several directions,"¹² the fragmentation of the intention of vision into the refracted co-dwelling of memory, attention, and expectation, the distended soul that seeks to encompass all in a unity but can only dwell in difference. For only the One has all things present to it by its intention. The question is not metaphysical; it is a far more fundamental question about the nature of "dissimilarity" – *distentio* belongs to that region of difference in which we measure out our days and in which our vision is scattered, diffused by the beauty of bodies and incapable of seeing Beauty in them and in its own seeing. Time itself is the distention, the dissemination of vision. And dwelling in the region of dissimilarity is the dissipation of that vision in which the mind beholds itself and in beholding itself, beholds the Lord God of the mind in whose image it is. Precisely such an imaging is denied under the conditions of time: to dwell in the region of dissimilarity, to see *in* time, is to fail to see God. *Time* is *lost* time precisely because time itself is always already *loss*.

And so we come to the will – to intention, and at last the tangled threads begin to come together. For what do memory and time have to do with vision? Everything, because vision is a function of *intention*. To poach on Kierkegaard, if purity of heart is to will one thing, purity of heart is thereby also to *see* one thing. The Augustinian *intentio* – intention, the precise opposite

term to the *distentio* of the soul that is time – is the will whereby one loves God, whereby one is gifted to love God by grace. The will by which one loves (or alternatively, the love that is the impulsion of one’s will) is the principle of vision for it is the orientation of the will by the *Spirit* that fixes the vision upon the immutability of the God in whom all things are good and beautiful. The Augustinian pneumatology focuses on Rom. 5.5, the love of God that is shed abroad in our hearts by the Spirit – for it is the Spirit, who is the bond of love between Father and Son, who is given as Gift to the Christian by which she loves God and the neighbor; this Spirit is herself the love of God: “love therefore is God from God...So it is the Holy Spirit of which he has given us that makes us abide in God and him in us.”¹³ This love “which brings us through to God”¹⁴ is *from* God and is in fact *God Godself*. The Spirit is the inhabitation of God by which we love God and ascend to God.¹⁵

The Spirit, therefore, gives (or rather, *is*) the gift of vision and is in fact the gift of the *divinization* of the imagination. For it is only insofar as the mind knows God, as we have seen, that it beholds God in the beauty of created things. The ascent to God from the beauty of bodies to the interior depths of the soul turns back *outward* to love the beauty of the world even as it ascends to contemplation of God, for it is precisely in this contemplation that one knows oneself in God and thus sees all things in God. The *distentio* – the time-bound scattering – of the soul’s vision is gathered in the Spirit’s seeing and loving into the *intentio* of a deified imagination: beauty is that which is given (that which gives itself) to this *intentio*. To say that God dwells in the memory is thus to say that the Spirit is given as the gift that transfigures the vision in the enrapturing out of time and into the life of the Trinity by the unity of a charity-fired intention. Seeing is a function of love, and seeing therefore is seeing the whole as the gift of love, for *intentio* is the vision of the eternal, that which has been assumed out of the *distentio* of the

temporal. To see in the Spirit, therefore, is to see *in* God and *out* of time; when one contemplates, when one prays, when one is caught up in the ascent to God by that impulsion of charity that is the gift of God, one beholds a whole in which a totality of the time of loss is made a vision of beauty: an aesthetic vision, then, arising out of the space of memory, the transfigured space of trauma, where God dwells. The dwelling of God is a certain kind of vision.

We can now say: *the divinized imagination is the vision inhabited by the Spirit and therefore fired by love in the unity of intention; it is the aesthetic redemption of lost time.*

V

And so I turn to one more interlocutor: St. Bonaventure. Restless in the back of our mind and the margin of our page as we read Augustine is that text that also continually subtends the thinking of the seraphic Doctor, as it does throughout the Middle Ages, perceptibly but subtly imbricated with the cosmic hierarchy of Pseudo-Dionysius: the eleventh chapter of *City of God*, in which is thematized the pneumatological love of bodies, the deified vision of beauty that informs the medieval Neoplatonist metaphysic of egress and regress. When Augustine adverts there to the “footprints” of God impressed within creation¹⁶ and states that the purpose of creation is to rise to God in the contemplation of that pure goodness which the Spirit preeminently is, in whom “the whole Trinity is revealed to us in the works of God”¹⁷ (the Spirit being thereby the gift of vision by which these works are gazed upon), Bonaventure takes this to be programmatic for the ascent of the mystical vision, the poetics of what we are here calling the divinized imagination.

“The created universe itself is a ladder leading us toward God,”¹⁸ Bonaventure says, at the inception of the performance of the six degrees of illumination that lead the soul to the vision of God in *The Journey of the Mind to God*. But in a deeply Augustinian note, he avers, “the

mirror offered by the outside world is of little or no value, useless, if the mirror of the mind is not clear and polished.”¹⁹ The *itinerarium* proceeds according to three pairs, corresponding to the Plotinian-Augustinian scheme of the gaze: outward to the external world, inward to the inner depths of the soul, above to the eternity of God. These dyads are organized by the distinction of the *traces*²⁰ and the *image* of God, denoted by the prepositions *through* (*per*) and *in*: “taking perceptible things as a mirror, we see God *through* them – through His traces, so to speak; but we also see Him *in* them, as He is there by His essence, power, and presence. This view is loftier than the first.”²¹ This basic distinction configures the text according to the same principle we have seen in Augustine but with the rigor of the twelfth century: the vision of God is available only insofar as the faculties of the mind, which ontologically already participate in the divine truth and light, are fired by the love of the Spirit and grace to contemplate the divine goodness. In each step the mind gazes upon the *traces* of God available to the natural powers of reason, which gaze once illuminated²² is enlivened by grace to understand the *images* of the Trinity in those same representations. A doublet whose distinction lies in the vision: the object of the gaze (world, soul, being) is the footprint of God insofar as eye that rests upon it exercises the natural powers of the soul, but that same object is transformed into a mirror of God for the soul that sees with the eye of grace. The Spirit who is the seeing of God in which God is seen.

In the middle set of steps, we see the Augustinian schematic we have been discussing thematized. Following the categories of *De Trinitate*, memory, intellection and will/love lead to eternity, truth, and goodness respectively.²³ In the third step of contemplation, the entire range of human knowledge is contained insofar as the natural powers of the mind that are illuminated by eternal truth are shown to be the traces of God, as Bonaventure will later elucidate in *On the Reduction of the Arts to Theology*.²⁴ The fourth step, however, reveals that the mind cannot in

fact be entered into as a contemplative space in its iconic function without the mediatorship of Christ: “Enlightened though a man may be...he cannot enter into himself, there to ‘take delight in the Lord,’ except through Christ, who says: ‘I am the door.’” On this level – the mind knowing itself only in knowing Christ within itself – “the spiritual senses are now restored for the seeing of the most beautiful, the hearing of the most harmonious...the soul is prepared for spiritual elevation by way of devotion, admiration, and exultation.”²⁵ This knowing then passes into the vision of God by the contemplating of the names of “being” and “goodness” (following Dionysius’ two privileged nominations of God), the latter being the direct contemplation of the holy Trinity, upon seeing which the mind can only be assumed into the *excessus*, the “ravishment” or “transport” of the soul beyond itself to unknowing union with God.²⁶ Here, we find with Bonaventure, such a motion is given only to the one who knows it, receives it, and desires it, “and no one desires it unless the fire of the Holy Spirit, whom Christ sent to earth, inflames him to the very marrow. That is why the apostle attributes to the Holy Spirit the revelation of such mystical wisdom.”²⁷ The motion of love passes beyond knowledge into the divine life by the fire of the Spirit.

The fine details of Bonaventure’s theology of ascent need not concern us here, nor the question as to the precise function of pneumatology in his thought and contemplative practice. What does bear upon our investigation is the way Bonaventure’s mysticism of love subtly dislocates the Dionysian hierarchy in favor of an Augustinian voluntarism: it is the will inflamed by love that leads the soul into union with God.²⁸ This accomplishes two things in the development of the Western tradition: first, the pneumatological grammar of the mystical ascent to God that instaurates the appropriation *and* alteration (one is tempted to say, subversion) of the “books of the Platonists” for a far more *motile* and *ambulatory* ontology of will and love – this

grammar is established as the basis of Western mystical discourse; second and related, the Dionysian cosmic hierarchy is *detached* and interiorized, for Augustine's intuition that the goodness of creation is only seen in the goodness of God that is the goodness through which all things are good – in, therefore, the inhabitation of the Spirit – is here inscribed into the pages of the Western theology of the self.

For in Bonaventure we have a vocabulary adumbrated that will allow us to articulate just what the redemption of lost time in the aesthetic vision might *look* like, even if we must read him on a slight diagonal. Our answer depends upon the vision that sees the world in God and as God's and therefore is deified in participation in the Spirit. It is this movement, and this movement alone, that *renders* world as God's creation: beauty becomes visible as the object of contemplation to the eye illuminated by grace. The contemplation of the Trinity is transport beyond time into the eternity of God's self-seeing, in which seeing alone the whole is seen at last: as beautiful, as sacramental, as the image of God. This movement *represents* lost time in the whole of an aesthetic vision of intention, and therefore participates in the Eternal Art in whom our minds inhere by that transcendence that is our deepest intimacy. For in Bonaventure (and it might be added, in his more famous contemporary across Paris), we find simultaneously the expression *and* the deconstructing of what we have come to call the medieval synthesis. For (to cast an eye toward Foucault) that order of similitude that passed into the Classical age, structured by emulation and analogy, was already an ossification of a far more subtle metaphysic of will and love in the Augustinian tradition. The Bonaventurian systemization of the Augustinian discourses of interiority and ascent marks the space within which the history of mysticism shows itself as the archaeology of a pneumatological grammar.²⁹

As we close, we recall the opening frames of *Andrei Rublev*: a peasant soaring in a primitive balloon, a misshapen and ragtag stitching of animal skins that manages for a few moments – impossible moments! – to fly. The camera soars over the waters and fields of the Russian plains (horses, of course, run below): for a brief second, though we don't possess the strength to keep the vision fixed, a new world appears, a necessary but inaccessible world. The gift of vision is given: the elevation of the mind, the suspension of time, the cry of ecstasy.

We have been arguing all along that what we are here calling “providence,” the redemption of lost time, is a function of aesthetic vision, a certain kind of seeing: the divinized imagination as the seeing of God in the Spirit, the inhabitation of God's eternity in the eschatological gift of the Spirit. Impelled by the gift of love, that love of God from God which is God, the memory of a life opens into the vision of the whole: the *intentio* whereby our vision participates in the eternity of the triune life bequeaths a seeing in which the whole is given as perfect beauty. For it is a seeing in the Spirit who is the love of God. In speaking of a divinized imagination, then, we are speaking of a certain pneumatology: a pneumatology of aesthetic vision. The icon is the whole of a life.

It is the Spirit that is the seeing in which the vision of God is seen. For seeing is a function of love, the vision impelled and animated by love: love's vision is desire and will, love's gain is divinization and transport. The Spirit, who always beholds the face of the Father, is the eschatological gift of the vision of God, and in the Spirit and thus in the eschaton already, a life is seen as is world: in God and as God sees it, for this is finally the beatific vision: to see God, to see as God sees, to see in God – a seeing whose name is the Holy Spirit, the seeing in which God is always seen.

¹ The sculpture metaphor is Tarkovksy's: see Andrey Tarkovsky, *Sculpting in Time: Reflections on the Cinema*, trans. Kitty Hunter-Blair (London: The Bodley Head, 1986), pgs. 63-64.

² This is the name and theme of the third chapter of *Sculpting in Time*, pgs. 57-81. This term expresses the deep realism and eschewal of abstraction that characterizes a Tarkovksy film – these terms alone demonstrating how regularly his basic technique is misunderstood.

³ *Ibid.*, pgs. 82-83.

⁴ On the chronotope of Tarkovsky, see Maya Turovskaya, *Tarkovsky: Cinema as Poetry*, trans. Natasha Ward (Boston: Faber and Faber, 1989), pgs. 85-93. The term is Bakhtin's: see "Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel," in *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays by M. M. Bakhtin*. ed. Michael Holquist, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981).

⁵ Augustine, *Confessions*, trans. Henry Chadwick (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), VII.x.16.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, VII.xii.18-xiii.19.

⁷ *Ibid.*, III.vi.11.

⁸ Denys Turner, *The Darkness of God: Negativity in Christian Mysticism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 69.

⁹ As Anselm will later put it in *Monologion* 1.

¹⁰ *Confessions*, X.i.1.

¹¹ For the following, X.vi.10-viii.12.

¹² For all this, see XI.xxvii.34-xxix.39

¹³ *The Trinity*, introduction, translation and notes Edmund Hill, O.P. (Brooklyn: New City Press, 1991), XV.31.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, XV.32.

¹⁵ Space precludes the possibility of accounting for the function of the mediatorship of Christ in this context. Indeed, the development of the relationship of Augustine's pneumatology and his ecclesiological christology and their function in the ascent to God is the necessary development of our argument here. Further, we have before us the resources with which we might begin to redress certain speculative *aporiai* in Augustine's trinitarian thought.

¹⁶ *City of God*, ed. R.W. Dyson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), XI.28.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, XI.24.

¹⁸ *The Journey of the Mind to God*, in *The Works of Bonaventure*, Vol. 1, trans José de Vinck (Quincy, IL: Franciscan Press, 1997 [1960]), 1.2.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, Preface 5.

²⁰ *Vestigia*, literally "footprints" – cf. Augustine above.

²¹ *Ibid.*, II.1.

²² The sequential language is inaccurate but inevitable, for the basic premise of the text is of course that such illumination by grace is the presupposition of the entire mystical enterprise.

²³ *Ibid.*, III.4. Note: the link of memory and eternity; goodness and will/love.

²⁴ In that text, Bonaventure more explicitly discourses on the metaphysics of light, derived from Alexander of Hale, that informs his particular version of the *egress-regress* cosmology; there the principle of the *reductio* of all the domains of knowledge to theology is that light which is "the source of all illumination; but at the same time...there are many lights which flow generously from that fontal source of light." *On the Reduction of the Arts to Theology*, trans. with introduction and commentary by Zachary Hayes, O.F.M. (Franciscan Institute: St. Bonaventure University, 1996), 1.

²⁵ *Journey of the Mind to God*, IV.3.

²⁶ It is not without significance – and here the trajectory of the Augustinian mystical tradition becomes quite complex – that the notion of mystical union here common to medieval discourse is more or less entirely absent from Augustine; for him, the soul's union is with the church as the *totus christus*: the mystical union is participation in the ecclesial union or, put differently, the eucharistic body. Cf. the discussion of Bernard McGinn, *The Presence of God: A History of Western Christian Mysticism*, Vol I: *The Foundations of Mysticism* (New York: Crossroad, 1991), pgs. 248-251.

²⁷ *The Journey of the Mind to God*, VII.4.

²⁸ On this, cf. Turner, *The Darkness of God*, 131-34.

²⁹ We cannot continue here the inquiry, but the next stage of this narrative would lead us into that space that has been opened up in the work of Henri de Lubac and Michel de Certeau.